Reports of people who are said to be highly sensitive to magnetic fields
or electromagnetic radiation are published occasionally, but I have yet to
hear of any such claims being scientifically tested. A recent report
concerns a woman who "said she suffered from piercing head pains, blurred
vision and nausea every time she went near a computer". It is claimed that
these effects are caused by anything containing a microchip, but more
old-fashioned electric and electronic devices do not affect her. She said
that her doctor told her that "her brain produced insufficient waves to
counteract the modern frequencies emitted by computers". The doctor also
said: "It is so rare people often dismiss it as a psychological problem,
but it is certainly not."
It would surely be quite simple to put such a
claim to the test.
All that is needed is to conduct a laboratory experiment in which the
woman is exposed to a device containing microchips, another device which
looks as if it might contain microchips but doesn't, and a concealed
device containing microchips. Similar experiments could be done to test
other people who make similar claims. I have never heard of such tests
being done; all we ever get is pseudoscientific gobbledegook. I wonder
why?
MANY critics of the psychosocial hypothesis (PSH) seem to assume that it
purports to explain all UFO reports, but this assumption is a serious
error which leads to much needless (and meaningless) controversy.
The purpose of the PSH is to strip away the psychological and mythical
elements from reports of alleged UFO incidents, so that the verifiable
facts of any particular case can be laid bare. What starts as a puzzling
sighting, or series of sightings, often accretes false interpretations
drawn from the UFO myths which have developed since 1947. When such a
sighting receives publicity it attracts hoaxers and fantasists who cause
confusion and make it seem, to the credulous, far more mysterious than it
really is.
The purpose of the PSH is not to attempt to show that unusual events do
not really happen but, by separating fact from imagination and
misinterpretation, to discover the truth about them. No complicated or
controversial psychological theories need to be employed to do this;
common sense is usually sufficient.
It is important to realise that the
PSH was developed in response to the extraterrestrial hypothesis (ETH). If
the popular myth of visitations by alien spacecraft did not exist, it
would have been taken for granted that UFO reports were generated by
sightings of unusual aircraft or natural phenomena, and that the
imperfections of human perception and memory could account for any strange
details or inconsistencies in the reports. No one would seriously suggest
UFO sightings as evidence of alien visitation unless there were compelling
reasons for doing so.
A good example of the difference between the ETH
approach and the PSH approach is the Berwyn Mountain case. A few years
ago, ETH proponents in Britain were putting about stories about this
incident which can briefly be summarised as follows:
On the night of 23 January 1974 a UFO crashed in the Berwyn Mountains in
North Wales. There were strange lights seen in the sky and a loud
explosion was heard. A local nurse, fearing that there might have been a
plane crash, set off up the mountain in her car, but was turned back by
soldiers guarding the area, but not before she saw the grounded UFO
glowing in the distance. Dead aliens from the saucer were taken by
soldiers to Porton Down in Wiltshire. Local people were closely questioned
by a team of mysterious strangers who moved into the area shortly after
the incident. These and other amazing facts were discovered by intrepid
ufologists, despite efforts by the authorities to conceal them.
As Andy
Roberts was to discover, the true facts were somewhat different. (1)
Although the incident happened a long time ago there had been no serious
investigation, apart from some ufologists talking to people who were, or
who claimed to be, witnesses and putting an ETH spin on the stories they
were told.
Roberts discovered that the lights in the sky were caused by
exceptionally bright bolides which were seen that evening. There were at
least four of them. Records kept by astronomers at Leicester University
showed that the timing of one of them coincided with an earth tremor,
accompanied by a sound like an explosion, at 8.30 pm. This earth tremor
was investigated by the British Geological Survey, which sent a team to
the area to question local people about the event. This accounts for the
story of the mysterious strangers.
The nurse did indeed go up the mountain but she did not encounter anyone
there. The story about the military sealing off part of the mountain
probably arose from the fact that witnesses were questioned many years
after the incident and probably confused it with an incident in 1982 when
an RAF Harrier jet crashed in the area and the crash site was sealed off
until the wreckage was cleared up.
The mysterious lights, thought to be a
grounded UFO, turned out to be lamps powered by car batteries being used
by poachers.
There was no independent corroboration of the story of the aliens being
taken to Porton Down, and internal inconsistencies in the story added to
its lack of credibility.
Of course, in unravelling this case, Andy Roberts did not explicitly
employ the PSH, except to suggest that the affair was "a tangle of belief
and wishful thinking". The point I am making here is that ETH proponents
who looked at the story tended to believe anything which confirmed their
beliefs, and showed little interest in discovering the facts and
critically analysing testimony to sort out reliable reporting from
misinterpretation and fantasy.
Finally, it should be emphasised that the PSH does not purport to explain
anything by itself. It is merely employed to consider how UFO reports are
so easily fitted into a ready-made mythology. Much is said about the
reliabilty or otherwise of witnesses, but the reliability of ufologists is
more important. A devotion to the ETH inevitably leads to wishful thinking
and a tendency to twist the facts to fit it. On the other hand, the PSH
must not be confused with the extreme sceptical approach, which discards
awkward facts in order to produce simple and satisfactorily mundane
solutions to mysterious occurrences.
Reference
1. Roberts, Andy. "Fire on the Mountain", in Jenny Randles,
Andy Roberts and David Clarke, The UFOs That Never Were, London House,
2000
Phillip H. Wiebe. Visions of Jesus: Direct Encounters from the New
Testament to Today, Oxford University Press, 1998. £12.99
While portions of this book of are of a chiefly theological character,
there is much in it which should be of interest to Magonia readers. The
core of the study deals with 28 cases of modern "Christic visions", in
which people claim to have had a vision or other chiefly visual encounter
with a figure they identify as Jesus Christ. These visions have much in
common with the range of visionary material we have been studying, and
much of Wiebe's commentary could apply to those as well.
He classifies the visions into four main categories: 1) those taking place
in dream or trance-like states; 2) waking experiences in which the
environment seems to change (what Green and McCreery called metachoric
experiences); 3) those in which the figure of Jesus is seen as
superimposed on the normal environment; 4) those of a collective
character, or which seem to impact on the environment, i.e. produce
physical evidence. Such a categorisation may be useful for a wider range
of anomalous personal experiences.
Of the four cases of physical evidence mentioned here, three are
essentially bounded by the narrative, i.e. the only evidence for it is
that the narrator says it exists. Two of these were healings, and one a
ground trace identical to those claimed in UFO reports: deep snow
disappeared where Jesus stood, and there was a 3-foot diameter circle of
burned grass. This suggests very much that we are dealing with a narrative
convention in which anomalies in the environment are incorporated into
narratives as "stigmata of the supernatural" marking places where
theophanies occurred rather than a unique physical phenomenon.
One case of physical evidence involved an alleged film of the
materialisation of Jesus in a Pentecostal church in Oakland, California,
part of an ongoing series of paranormal events there. Various other
people, including Wiebe himself as a teenager, remember seeing the film,
but it comes as no surprise to Magonians that it is now reported stolen.
Memories of the film differ, and some people who were present when it was
shown do not appear to have any memory of it at all. Is there a connection
here with the newish Fortean experience, memories of non-existent
photographs, like the "Thunderbird" photograph which has been dealt with
at length in Strange Magazine.
The general run of experiences do not look as though they have a common
origin; some seem to relate to dream-like, possibly narcoleptic and
epileptiform states, others fall into the hypnogogic/hypnopomic category,
some within the context of spiritual crisis and religious conversion,
while others have a strange matter-of-fact quality. Of course it has to be
borne in mind that what we are really dealing with here are personal
memorates of experience, not experience itself, as Wiebe was not present
when any of these events took place. In some cases the narratives do
appear to be part of an established religious biography, particularly when
the narrator is a religious professional of one sort or another.
Wiebe
examines a range of explanations for these experiences, supernatural,
paranormal, psychological and neurological, not finding any of them truly
satisfactory, but suggests that they may be tentatively interpreted as
evidence of the transcendental. That conclusion he would admit must be a
matter of personal faith, and he hints that such an interpretation would
not necessarily contradict a naturalistic explanation at the empirical
level.
Peter Rogerson
I would like to say some words on a certain often repeated argument that
goes: "The results of the Battelle Memorial Institute study showed that
the better the sighting, the more likely it is to be unexplainable in
terms of known phenomena, hence true UFOs do exist". This study,
commissioned by the USAF in the fifties, found that "excellent" reports
contained a higher percentage of "unknowns" than "poor" reports (besides
"knowns" and "unknowns", there was a separate category for "insufficient
information" reports, so that couldn't be counted). But can we really draw
any conclusion from such heterogeneous data, such disputable criteria and
so many factors playing their roles?
The usual assumption underlying the argument is: "If there were no true
UFOs, the most reliable cases would have the lowest percentage of
unexplained"
I'll try to show that this is dubious, at best.
The Battelle analysts divided the sightings into reliability groups, based
on the quality, completeness and self-consistency of the report and upon
the quality and experience of the witness. We can argue about how can this
evaluation be accomplished in practice and about its true relevance, but
this is not the point that I want to make here.
If we focus on the report side of this concept of reliability, it seems
reasonable that the cases considered most reliable are the least likely to
have erroneous data or to be incomplete in their descriptions and hence
should have the least percentage of unknowns if there were no true UFOs.
But what if we focus on the witness side?
1) We'll assume that the most reliable witnesses are the least prone to
experience misperceptions/misinterpretations that could lead them to
report UFOs.
2) Let's suppose that most, if not all, UFO cases are explainable, most of
them as misperceptions/misinterpretations (for simplicity's sake, we'll
set aside delusions, hoaxes . . . ).
3) The key point is that the most reliable witnesses will report the least
number of cases due to misperceptions/misinterpretations but those
reported will be in the class of those most difficult to explain, since
they are not easily fooled by most stimuli, at least under normal
conditions.
4) Therefore, after the analysis, the group of cases with the more
reliable witnesses will show the larger percentage of unknowns. Note that
in any group of less reliable witnesses, besides these difficult cases
we'll find many cases of misperceptions/misinterpretations more easily
resolvable after analysis, that will count as knowns, so lowering the
percentage of unknowns.
5) Finally, this trend will also appear in the overall analysis of cases
vs. reliability, since witness reliability is one of the pillars of the
general concept of reliability handled in the study. Hence we conclude
that the cases considered most reliable should have the higher percentage
of unknowns if there were no true UFOs!
Obviously, this is not to say that the Battelle results prove that there
are no true UFOs. What I intended to show is that they don't admit a
straightforward interpretation as many ufologists think.
I hope the
examples below will help to clarify all this.
Let's start with a group of
so-called "reliable witnesses" and another of average people. Now imagine
that individuals from both groups experience the following situations:
a) At night, in a secluded place, members of a sect perform a silent
procession, holding torches and wearing black clothes. Casual observers
are surprised by strange lights moving in circle near the ground for some
minutes.
b) An unusual red light (in fact, Venus) seems to approach the witness's
plane and keep pace with it for a while before disappearing at a fantastic
speed. Later, the witness will report a wrong date for the event.
c) Witnesses observe a landed "flying saucer" and, afterwards, an
ascending green light, all arranged by sophisticated pranksters.
Observers
in both groups report the three sightings above as UFOs. Subsequent
analysis fails to solve them and they remain as unknowns.
d) A plane brightly illuminated by the sun makes an odd display in the
twilight sky.
e) A cloud in the upper atmosphere resulting from a ballistic missile
secret test is taken for a mysterious nearby phenomenon by some observers.
Again, witnesses in both groups report these sightings as UFOs. But this
time, subsequent analysis finds the right explanations.
f) One night, an observer from the "average" group discovers the hovering
lights of a phantom airship. A nearby reliable observer recognizes Venus
and Jupiter, very close in conjunction.
g) A yellowish disc follows the car of a witness of the "average" group
for many miles and, finally, it seems to land behind some trees. Shortly
after, a "reliable" observer experiences the same, but when he stops the
car to better observe he quickly realises he has been watching the moon.
In these two last examples, only observers from the second group (less
reliable observers) report seeing UFOs. Analysis comes up later with the
correct identifications.
To sum up, the resulting proportion of unknowns in the "reliable
witnesses" group is 60% (3 out of 5), while in the "average witnesses"
group it is about 43% (3 out of 7)! Hence, if there were no true UFOs, the
cases with most reliable witnesses would have the highest percentage
unexplained.
Manuel Borraz, Barcelona, Spain
The Daily Telegraph has long been noted for its eccentric readers' letters. Some years ago there was a lengthy correspondence on the subject of pet flies. Recently there has been one on the sport of wasp hunting, the object being to trace the wasp back to its nest. This involves holding the wasp against a window and tying a length of white cotton round it. The wasp is then released and, slowed down by the cotton, is easily followed. Another correspondent suggested it was better to sprinkle them with flour to make them highly visible. Mr Paul Carr-Griffin of Llanfairpwllgwyngyllgogerychwyrndrobwllllantysiliogogogooch, expected that the Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Wasps would ask the Government to ban the sport. (I am not making this up - Ed.)